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VILLAGE INCORPORATION:
A SOLUTION TO UNDESIRABLE LAND USES?
West Columbia and Brazoria, Texas, jointly purchased a 100-acre
tract of land in a rural residential area known as Wild Peach,' to be
used as a land-fill garbage disposal site. The inhabitants of Wild
Peach, learning of the intended use of the land, incorporated and
passed an ordinance, the effect of which prohibited West Columbia
and Brazoria from dumping garbage in that area. West Columbia
and Brazoria challenged the validity of this incorporation, alleging
that it failed to comply with relevant statutory provisions2 in that
(1) the area allegedly incorporated contained fewer than 200 in-
habitants; (2) even if there were more than 200 inhabitants, parts of
the existing village were arbitrarily excluded; and (3) part of the
allegedly incorporated area was not intended to be used strictly for
town purposes. Texas statutes governing incorporation limit the
amount of area that can be included in a village,3 set a population
minimums and stipulate that the area included must be "intended
strictly for town purposes."'
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Harang v. State ex rel. City
of W Vest Columbia held the incorporation void. The Harang court,
in part, based its decision on its determination that Wild Peach was
not a village "in fact" and, therefore, could not meet statutory popu-
1. The inhabitants of Wild Peach each owned from one to 25 acres of land.
The population within the village boundaries was 374 while that of the whole
community was approximately 1500 to 2000.
2. Tax. REv. Crv. STAT. arts. 971, 1133-53(a) (1963). The court based its
opinion on articles 1133-34. Article 1134 provides, in part:
If the inhabitants of such town or village desire to be so incorporated, at
least twenty residents thereof, who would be qualified voters under the pro-
visions of this chapter shall file an application for that purpose in the office
of the county judge of the county in which the town or village is situated,
stating the boundaries of the proposed town or village, the name by which it
is to be known when incorporated, and accompany the same with a plat of
the proposed town or village including therein no territory except that which
is intended to be used for strictly town purposes ....
3. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 971 (1963).
4. Id. art. 1133.
5. Id. art. 1134.
6. 466 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
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lation requirements. The court cited the unusual shape of the "vil-
lage" 7 and the fact that the residences within the community were
widely dispersed, often with a mile or more between them. These
two factors drew into question the susceptibility of the area for the
receipt of municipal services. Without such susceptibility, a question
arose whether the territory included was "intended strictly for town
purposes"8 and whether there was a need for incorporation. The
court also found no apparent justification for the exclusion of that
part of the whole Wild Peach community which was not included
within the "village" boundaries. No judgment was made as to the
problems and equities raised by the action which precipitated the
incorporation, i.e., the purchase of land to be used as a garbage dis-
posal site for two neighboring towns.
Generally, the Texas incorporation statutes seem to be in accord
with standards codified in other states. Many statutes do nothing
more than set minimum limits in population and population den-
sity.9 Those states which do have additional requirements often
embody them in such ambiguous terms as "reasonable"10  or
"proper,"'" and thus leave considerable room for court interpretation.
Several statutes also contain requirements of a certain level of assessed
property values (to insure the area to be incorporated has a sufficient
tax base to support incorporation purposes) 12 and prohibitions of new
municipalities within a certain distance of existing ones.13 A few
states, recognizing the problems that appear with "incorporation-
made-easy" statutes, have enacted more restrictive statutes which set
7. In attempting to meet statutory area and population requirements, the in-
corporators included strips of land adjacent to 15 miles of county roads and the
land-fill site. There was only one bulk area and it only contained seven homes.
8. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 1134 (1963).
9. Mandelker, Standards for Municipal Corporations on the Urban Fringe, 36
TExAs L. lEv. 269, 277 (1958). See, e.g., ARE. STAT. ANN. § 19-101 (1968);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 165.01 (Supp. 1970), amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 165.01
(1966); IcH. STAT. ANN. § 5.1202 (1961); N.J. Rv. STAT. § 40:123-1 (1967);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 1301 (1967).
10. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 80.020 (1953).
11. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 53, § 45206 (Purdon 1957).
12. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 3374-03 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-9.1
(1972); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 707.02 (Page Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 6-1803 (Supp. 1970).
13. See, e.g., A.A. CODE fit. 37, § 10 (Supp. 1969); Arm. REv. STAT. ANN. §
9-101.01 (Supp. 1972); IowA CODE ANN. § 362.1 (Supp. 1972); NaB. IRV.
STAT. § 17-201 (1970); WAsHr. REv. CODE ANN. § 35.02.010 (Supp. 1970).
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out explicit requirements and guidelines.' One such example is Vir-
ginia, 15 whose statute is so restrictive that it seems to have made it all
but impossible for any governmental unit below the county level to
incorporate.6 The Virginia example is not typical, however, and most
statutes give only general guidelines for courts to follow in judging
the validity of incorporation.17
Because of the generality of the statutes, many standards have
been formulated by courts to give greater insight into legislative
intent.'8 The standards applied by most courts are similar to those
relied upon in Harang. The court-made criteria for judging incor-
porations fall roughly into two general categories. One set of consid-
erations involves whether or not a "village" actually exists (including
the question of whether or not the natural boundaries of the com-
munity coincide with the proposed incorporation boundaries); the
other involves the court's objective determination of the need for in-
corporation.
The existence of some sort of urban area is generally a definite pre-
requisite to village incorporation.19 Courts often look to the con-
14. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54774 (Deering Supp. 1972); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 15-116 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 414.02 (Supp. 1972).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-967 (1950). A portion of the statute says:
1) It will be to the interest of the inhabitants within the proposed town;
2) The prayer of the petition is reasonable;
3) The general good of the community will be promoted;
4) The number of inhabitants of the proposed town exceeds 1000;(5) The area of land designated to be embraced within the town is not
excessive;(6) The population density of the county in which such community is lo-
cated does not exceed 125 persons per square mile according to the last pre-
ceding United States census, or other census directed by the court; and(7) That the services required by the community cannot be provided by the
establishment of a sanitary district, or under other arrangements provided
by law, or through extension of existing services provided by the county in
which such community is located.
16. D. MANDELKR, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVRONMENT 298 (2d ed. 1971).
17. See notes 9-13 supra.
18. Some courts adhere strictly to the statutes. If the procedural requirements
have been met, they will not upset an incorporation however absurd it may be.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Russell v. Town of Loyalton, 147 Cal. 774, 82 P. 620
(1905); State ex rel. Cole v. City of Hendersonville, 223 Tenn. 365, 445 S.W.2d
652 (1969). But cf. State ex rel. Holland v. Lammers, 113 Wis. 398, 89 N.W.
501 (1902).
19. See, e.g., Larkin v. Bontatibus, 145 Conn. 570, 145 A.2d 133 (1958);
Town of Enterprise v. State, 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740 (1892); People ex rel.
Shumway v. Bennett, 29 ich. 451 (1874); Pyne Borough Incorporation, 6 Pa.
Dist. 353 (1897); State ex tel. Town of Holland v. Lammers, 113 Wis. 398, 89
N.W. 501 (1902).
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tiguity of the land included, the proximity of the residences and the
degree of common interest among the inhabitants20 for dues as to the
presence of a "village." The court, in In re Incorporation of Village of
Oconomowac Lake,21 spoke to this issue:
If an area is not a village, as conceived by the framers of the
constitution, then area and density of population per se do not
make it so. The verb "to incorporate" in itself implies a blend-
ing into a consistent, harmonious whole. A village is a political,
sociological, and geographic unit.22
This is a fairly comprehensive statement of what factors courts have
considered in testing the validity of new incorporations. More spe-
cifically, they have looked to such facts as the physical shape of the
"village,"23 the means for and presence of social intercourse within
the boundaries, 24 the likelihood of future growth, 25 the presence of a
business or commercial center26 and the character of any unplatted
20. The court, in State ex tel. Township of Copley v. Village of Webb, 250
Minn. 22, 83 N.W.2d 788 (1957), in attempting to gauge the amount of com-
munity feeling present, cited the presence of civic groups and organizations, and
stated that it could find no more tangible evidence of an existing community
spirit or interest.
21. 270 Wis. 530, 72 N.W.2d 544 (1955).
22. Id. at 536, 72 N.W.2d at 547. See Cutler, Characteristics of Land Requiredfor Incorporation or Expansion of a Municipality, 1958 Wis. L. Rv. 6, 22 indi-
cating that In re Village of Oconomowac Lake restricted the doctrine announced
in State ex tel. Town of Holland v. Lammers, 113 Wis. 398, 89 N.W. 501 (1902),
which had governed Wisconsin incorporations for over 50 years.
23. See, e.g., Western Nat'l Bank v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d 342, 167
N.E.2d 169 (1960); State ex tel. Loy v. Mote, 48 Neb. 683, 67 N.W. 810 (1896);
Hoye v. Schaefer, 109 Ohio App. 489, 157 N.E.2d 140 (1959); Scharping v.
Johnson, 32 Wis. 2d 383, 145 N.W.2d 691 (1966). But see People v. Kramer, 21
Ill. 2d 392, 172 N.E.2d 757 (1961) where the court stated: "Although there
may be problems arising in the administration of such an irregular territory, such
matters are a function of the legislature and not the courts."
24. This consideration has been found especially in Wisconsin. See, e.g., In r
Village of Oconomowac Lake, 270 Wis. 530, 72 N.W.2d 544 (1955); In re Vil-
lage of St. Francis, 209 Wis. 645, 245 N.W. 840 (1932); In re Village of
Chenequa, 197 Wis. 163, 221 N.W. 856 (1928).
25. See, e.g., State ex tel. Ervin v. City of Oakland Park, 42 So. 2d 270 (Fla.
1949); State ex tel. Burnquist v. Village of St. Anthony, 223 Minn. 149, 26
N.W.2d 193 (1947); In re Borough of Churchill, 111 Pa. Super. 380, 170 A. 319(1934); Fenton v. Ryan, 140 Wis. 353, 122 N.W. 756 (1909).
26. See, e.g., State ex tel. Township of Copley v. Village of Webb, 250 Minn.
22, 83 N.W.2d 788 (1957); State ex tel. Burnquist v. Village of St. Anthony, 223
Minn. 149, 26 N.W.2d 193 (1947).
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land within the "village" limits-27 Because Wild Peach did not fulfill
even the minimum statutory requirements, the Harang court did not
find it necessary to reach these questions. It did consider, however,
the exclusion of part of the existing community from the new munic-
ipality and found it to be suspect. Unless such an exclusion is due
to natural, social or economic factors, many courts have rejected such
incorporation plans.- However, in a recent case,29 the Tennessee
Supreme Court held contrary to this view and allowed a municipality
which was eighteen one-hundredths of a square mile in size to incor-
porate in a densely populated area which was much larger.
The need to incorporate is often judged by the need for municipal
services.-G Unless there is a need to change the existing situation,
courts have held that the area has no justifiable reason for seeking
incorporation and the requisite powers that accompany it.3' The
already existing availability of municipal services outside the "vil-
lage" limits has also been a factor in the determination of the pres-
ence of a need. 2 In Harang, the court doubted the need or feasibility
of providing municipal services for the inhabitants of Wild Peach.
The fact that Wild Peach had taken only one action as a village
since incorporation-passage of the ordinance regulating use of the
land-fill site-also raised doubts as to its need for such facilities.
A factor which courts are increasingly considering is the effect of
27. See, e.g., Arnold v. McCarroll, 200 Ark. 1094, 143 S.W.2d 35 (1940);
McKeon v. City of Council Bluffs, 206 Iowa 556, 221 N.W. 351 (1928); State ex
rel. Childs v. Village of Minnetonka, 57 Minn. 526, 59 N.W. 972 (1894); State
ex rel. Hammond v. Dimond, 44 Neb. 154, 62 N.W. 498 (1895); State ex rel.
Rushing v. Town of Baird, 79 Tex. 63, 15 S.W. 98 (1890).
28. See, e.g., Raucher v. Frost, 53 S.W. 318 (Ct. Ch. App. Tenn. 1899); State
v,. Perkins, 360 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Cir. App. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 367
S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1963); Bennett v. Garrett, 132 Va. 397, 112 S.E.
772 (1922).
29. State ex rel. Cole v. City of Hendersonville, 223 Tenn. 365, 445 S.W.2d
652 (1969).
30. Municipal services usually include such things as police and fire protection,
sewage systems, health protection, education, recreation, zoning, pollution control
and utility services. Probably a combination of these and similar services would
be necessary to constitute sufficient need.
31. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pickrell v. Downey, 102 Ariz. 360, 430 P.2d 122
(1967); State ex rel. Simpson v. Village of Alice, 112 Mflnn. 330, 127 N.W. 1118
(1910).
32. See, e.g., State ex rel. Burnquist v. Village of North Pole, 213 Minn. 289,
6 N.W.2d 458 (1942); In re Village of St. Francis, 209 Wis. 645, 245 N.W. 840
(1932). For a codification of such a standard see AI.AscA STAT. § 29.10.019(c)
(Supp. 1971).
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an incorporation on surrounding areas.33 One commentator calls
this the "broad community" test.34 This consideration is intended to
prevent a heavily populated area from being indefinitely subdivided
at the whim of a limited group of people, thereby causing problems
for the region as a whole. Since this test is secondary to the determi-
nation of the existence of a "village," the Harang court did not
find it necessary to consider it.
Some states have moved away from the traditional judicial review
of incorporations to review by administrative agencies, feeling that
while court regulation of incorporation is better than no regulation,
an expert administrative body is preferable.35 The result in Harang
probably would not change under such a system, however, as such
agencies still follow the same incorporation statutes and apply many
33. This approach has been codified in VA. CoDE ANN. § 15.1-967 (1950). See
also State ex rel. Township of Copley v. Village of Webb, 250 Minn. 22, 83
N.W.2d 788 (1957); Bennett v. Garrett, 132 Va. 397, 112 S.B. 772 (1922);
Board of Supervisors v. Duke, 113 Va. 94, 73 S.E. 456 (1912); Scharping v.
Johnson, 32 Wis. 2d 383, 145 N.W.2d 691 (1966).
It is clear that excessive suburban incorporation often creates governmental
duplication and rivalry which can increase the cost and lower the efficiency of
municipal services in the area. Although suburban incorporation is historically
respectable and literally carries out the principle of home rule, the fragmentation
of a metropolitan area into too many tiny municipalities is against the public
interest of the larger metropolitan area and indirectly impedes truly effective
home rule in such areas. See Cutler, supra note 22.
34. Mandelker, supra note 9, at 289.
35. See Gorlick, Control of Urban Sprawl, California Style, 2 URnAN LAW. 95
(1970); Note, The Minnesota Municipal Commission-Statewide Administrative
Review of Municipal Annexations and Incorporations, 50 MINN. L. Rv. 911
(1966). See also Johnson, The Wisconsin Experience with State-Level Review of
Municipal Incorporations, Consolidations, and Annexations, 1965 Wis. L. Rv.
462, which states that some of the purposes and intent of the legislature enacting
the administrative review bill were:
(1) to provide more comprehensive state-wide control over development of
new municipalities to assure the creation of such units is in the public in-
terest;
(2) to establish different standards for review of proposed incorporations in
urban and rural areas;
(3) to develop a "public interest" test which is separate from judicial
review;(4) to require that a state level review officer must find that the incorpora-
tion will not substantially hinder the solution of governmental problems in
a metropolitan area before he can approve it.
Id. at 466. Statutory provisions which provide for some type of administrative
review are: CAL. GOV'T CoDE § 54774 (Deering Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 414.02 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.014 (Supp. 1971), amending Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 66.014 (1965).
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of the same standards discussed above, though with possibly more
flexibility.
However, such agencies would probably put more emphasis on the
motives of the incorporators-something the Harang court and many
other courts refuse to do. One court has gone so far as to say where
the procedural requirements have been met, the motives of the in-
corporators are immaterial.A6 But a Texas court, shortly before the
decision in Harang, was swayed by the fact that the incorporation was
openly commenced for "private purposes." 37 If courts continue to
ignore the real reasons behind an incorporation, any reason might
become a legitimate municipal purpose; for example, incorporation
to prevent the introduction of low-income housing.
From the above discussion, it is evident that Wild Peach would
probably have had a difficult time incorporating in most other states.
But whether this is an equitable result is another question. Should a
city be allowed to remove an offensive municipal facility to an unin-
corporated community? This is not an easy question as there are
several factors that must be considered. For example, in the Harang
case, the type of facility installed, its effect on contiguous areas and
the reasons of West Columbia and Brazoria for choosing that area are
important factors. If there will be some undesirable effects, it would
only seem proper that the inhabitants of that area should have some
say in the matter. But it must be remembered that the purpose of
incorporation is not to provide municipal powers to those who do not
need or want them except for their own private purposes.
The residents of Wild Peach might have secured a solution to their
problem through other means. Possibly they could have brought an
action in public or private nuisance, or in trespass, although before
the garbage dump began operating, they probably would have had
difficulty proving injury. These actions all involve formidable prob-
36. Raucher v. Frost, 53 S.W. 318, 321 (Ct. Ch. App. Tenn. 1899). Some
cases, with admittedly less valid reasons for incorporation than Wild Peach had,
are: State ex rel. Burnquist v. Village of North Pole, 213 Minn. 289, 6 N.W.2d
458 (1942) (to secure a liquor license); State ex rel. Eagleton v. Champ, 393
S.W.2d 516 (Mo. 1965) (to provide a base from which municipal bonds could be
issued); State ex rel. Little v. Board of Comm'rs 182 Neb. 419, 155 N.W.2d 351
(1967) (to avoid annexation), Hoye v. Schaefer, 157 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio App.
1959) (to avoid annexation); Thompson v. City of West Lake Hills, 457 S.W.2d
398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (to preserve a rural setting).
37. Thompson v. City of West Lake Hills, 457 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970).
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lems,38 especially in reaching the solution which the Wild Peach resi-
dents seemed to be seeking, i.e., removal of the landfill site from their
area. But at least these remedies seemed to be suited to their problem
since they directly attacked the issue rather than hid the real question
under the guise of need for incorporation. Probably the best solution
for all concerned would be some form of county zoning or an agree-
ment under an inter-local cooperation act. Such cooperative planning
would best serve the region's interests over the long run.11
Although the Harang decision may have frustrated an attempt to
solve a valid problem, the decision is well grounded in case and
statutory law, and the court had little choice but to reach the con-
dusion it did. A holding in favor of incorporation would be setting
a new and unwise precedent. The Wild Peach residents had other
remedies that were more appropriate to their problem.
Patricia C. Armstrong
38. For example, to prove a private nuisance, the plaintiff ordinarily must have
suffered material harm or substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of
his property. With a public nuisance, it must be established that something is
being done that injuriously affects the public safety, health or morals or effects
some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public. With trespass,
the complaining party must show a direct physical entry by a person or an object
(although the size of the object can be small). Also, in many cases, courts limit
relief to money damages, which might be inadequate for the Wild Peach residents.
See Comment, Environmental Law: New Legal Concepts in the Anti-Pollution
Fight, 36 Mo. L. Rmv. 78 (1971).
39. See, e.g., Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA.
L. Rev. 515 (1957).
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